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Abstract
Prominent hotel chains quote a booking price for a particular type of rooms on each day and
dynamically update these prices over time. We present a novel Markov decision process (MDP)
formulation that determines the optimal booking price for a single type of rooms under this
strategy, while considering the availability of rooms throughout the multiple-day stays requested
by customers. We analyze special cases of our MDP to highlight the importance of modeling
multiple-day stays and provide guidelines to potentially simplify the implementation of pricing
policies around peak-demand events such as public holidays and conferences. Since computing
an optimal policy to our MDP is intractable in general, we develop heuristics based on a fluid
approximation and approximate linear programming (ALP). We numerically benchmark our
heuristics against a single-day decomposition approach (SDD) and an adaptation of a fixed-
price heuristic. The ALP-based heuristic (i) outperforms the other methods; (ii) generates up
to 7% and 6% more revenue than the SDD and the fixed-price heuristic respectively; and (iii)
incurs a revenue loss of only less than 1% when using our pricing structure around peak-demand
events, which supports the use of this simple pricing profile. Our findings are potentially relevant
beyond the hotel domain for applications involving the dynamic pricing of capacitated resources.
Keywords: hotel revenue management, resource pricing, Markov decision process, approximate
dynamic programming
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1 Introduction
Many companies face the challenge of optimally setting the prices of their services or products
at different stages of a selling season so that their revenue is maximized. For example, companies
in the travel industry sell service capacity over a season, which includes seats on airline flights,
cabins on cruises, and rooms in hotels. A good pricing policy is often vital to the survival of these
companies. This problem is also common among retailers who sell perishable or fashion products.
These products usually have a replenishment lead time much longer than the selling season, and
must be discarded if they remain unsold after the season. The dynamic pricing problems faced
by these companies have two common properties (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003, Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak, 2003, Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004): (i) capacity or inventory for the selling season is
fixed, and (ii) a deadline exists after which sales must cease.
In the domain of hotel revenue management, customers typically request rooms for multiple-
day stays (products). If the hotel is out of rooms (resources) for any day within the requested
duration, the customer will turn away. We study the observed room pricing practice of quoting
only a single booking price (such as the one shown on its website) at any point in time to all
customers for the same day of stay. These prices are dynamically updated over time. This pricing
strategy falls under the umbrella of best available rate pricing (Carvell and Quan, 2005 and Rohlfs
and Kimes, 2007). It is adopted, for example, by hotels owned by Marriott International Inc. and
Intercontinental Hotels Group (IHG) with 19 and 9 hotel brands respectively. Prominent brands
in these hotel chains include Courtyard, Crowne plaza, Holiday inn, Intercontinental hotels and
resorts, Marriott, Renaissance, and Residence inn. Figure 1 provides an example of actual prices
posted on Expedia.com for a deluxe room at the Courtyard Marriott located close to the Chicago
Midway airport. Figures 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) correspond to bookings with lengths of stay
equal to 12, 6, 4, and 3, respectively. For instance, the 12-day stay corresponds to a check-in on
10/23/2016 (Sunday) and a check-out on 11/04/2016 (Friday), with prices quoted for 12 nights
spanning 10/23/2016 (Sunday) to 11/03/2016 (Thursday). As can be seen in these figures, the
room prices on each day coincide regardless of the chosen start and length of stay.
Hotels implementing the above pricing strategy determine the booking price for a room on each
individual day, and charge a multiple-day stay the sum of these prices over the duration of stay.
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Figure 1: Booking prices for a deluxe room at the Courtyard Marriott Chicago Mid-
way Airport accessed on 10/15/2016 for different lengths of stay between 10/23/2016
(Sunday) and 11/03/2016 (Thursday).
Nevertheless, it is the average price over the multiple-day stay that is prominently displayed on
booking websites (for example, Expedia.com). The daily price breakdown is accessible with some
additional clicks. The average price derived from the booking price on each day is perceived by
customers as being more transparent, which disincentivizes them from looking at daily prices with
different windows of stay. Further, quoting the booking price for each day also allows unambiguous
adjustments in a statement if there is any extension or reduction in the length of stay.
When pricing rooms in this manner, a hotel may vary the booking prices across different days
such that it can exploit the high demands for certain days, but maintain an attractive average daily
booking price for customers willing to stay for multiple days. Is the modeling of multiple-day stays
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important when determining booking prices and does it affect the sensitivity of booking price to
demand? If some days have significantly higher demand for rooms due to a peak-demand event (for
example, a conference), what booking price should be quoted for each day? What methods can be
used to compute dynamic room pricing policies?
Motivated to shed light on these questions, we formulate a Markov decision process to model a
hotel with a single room type using the dynamic pricing practice discussed above. Customers check
the booking prices and make reservations at random points during an extended period of time known
as the pricing-booking horizon. Each reservation (usually through the Internet) spans multiple days
in a service horizon, which is an extended duration of time in the future where a booking price
for each day is specified. For the sake of simplicity, we assume these two horizons do not overlap.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between a pricing-booking horizon and a service horizon. A
reservation is made if there is at least one room available for all days during the multiple-day stay
and the customer is happy with the total booking price.
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Figure 2: The pricing-booking horizon and the service horizon.
Customers having the same arrival and departure dates in the service horizon belong to the
same class. Each class can have a different stochastic and non-stationary demand function. This
allows our model to capture realistic features such as a surge in room requests for a conference
approaching its start date, higher willingness to pay of customers that are attending a sports event,
and increase in their willingness to pay after they learn that their favorite teams are playing in
the event. Customers from different classes request rooms at random points in the pricing-booking
horizon (that is, we do not assume one class requests after another). Given these random requests,
our Markov decision process formulation determines the daily booking prices in the service horizon
such that the expected revenue over the pricing-booking horizon is maximized.
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We make the following contributions:
1. We provide a Markov decision process formulation that dynamically prices capacitated re-
sources. In contrast, existing models study the dynamic pricing of products, predominantly in
airline network revenue management (see, for example, §5.4 of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004))
and recently in the context of hotel room pricing (Zhang and Weatherford, 2016). Such mod-
els can be used to price multiple-day stays (products) directly, but do not represent all hotel
pricing strategies. In particular, there are prominent hotels that price rooms on each day
(resources) and charge the sum of these prices over a multiple-day stay. Our model of this
unexplored dynamic pricing practice in the hotel industry is novel.
2. We show that optimizing over the booking prices is a concave quadratic maximization problem,
which is critical for efficiently computing a dynamic pricing policy using the value function or
its approximations. We compare the optimal pricing policy with a single-day decomposition
approach and study the sensitivity of hotel room prices around peak-demand events in special
cases that are analytically tractable. Our findings suggest the following insights: (i) The
sensitivity of the room price to demand parameters differs under the optimal policy that
accounts for multiple-day stays and a policy based on the single-day decomposition approach.
(ii) To maximize revenue around peak-demand events, hotels should not only substantially
raise the booking prices for some high-demand days, but also significantly lower the booking
prices for the low-demand days that are immediately adjacent to these high-demand days.
The former insight highlights the importance of modeling multiple-day stays and the latter
insight can be used to reduce the number of prices around peak-demand events, thus making
the pricing policies potentially easier to interpret and implement.
3. To overcome the intractability of computing an optimal pricing policy, we develop heuristic
pricing policies based on a fluid approximation and approximate linear programming (ALP).
Our fluid approximation differs from ones developed in the product-pricing setting. Our
ALP-based pricing policy employs an affine value function approximation (Schweitzer and
Seidmann, 1985, de Farias and Van Roy, 2003, Adelman, 2007). Our constraint generation
algorithm to solve the ALP and compute this approximation is different from those in the
literature due to model-specific nonlinearities arising from pricing resources (rooms) instead
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of products.
We numerically benchmark our heuristics against the single-day decomposition approach and
an adaptation of a fixed-price heuristic by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). We obtain the
following insights from our numerical study: (i) Pricing policies that incorporate multiple-
day stays are significantly better than ones that do not include this feature by up to 7%
on our instances. (ii) The ALP heuristic based on an affine approximation delivers the best
performance despite the inherent non-convexities of the problem. (iii) Imposing the pricing
structure for peak-demand events (see point (2) above) in the ALP heuristic leads to only
a less than 1% loss in revenue. (iv) The fluid approximation heuristic performs very well
when capacity is abundant but can be suboptimal when capacity is limited. Findings (i)–(iii)
are new, while (iv) is consistent with analogous observations in the product-pricing setting
(Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994, 1997).
Our model and insights are potentially relevant beyond the hotel domain for other applications
involving dynamic pricing of capacitated resources used by multiple products. For example, when
ordering customized laptops (products) from the Dell or Toshiba website, the product price is the
sum of the prices of individual components (resources) used to build it. Our research also motivates
further study on dynamic resource-pricing models, which appear to have received limited attention
in the dynamic pricing literature.
This paper is outlined as follows. We review related literature in §2. We formulate the dynamic
pricing problem for hotels and contrast it with product-pricing models in §3. We analyze the optimal
policy in §4. We propose a fluid approximation heuristic in §5. We develop several approximate
dynamic programming heuristics to obtain pricing policies that consider multiple-day stays in §6,
and benchmark them against the optimal policy (if available) and the single-day decomposition
approach in §7. We conclude in §8 and present all proofs in Online Appendix A.
2 Related literature
Kimes (1989) gives a nice overview of yield management in the hotel industry. The author
highlights that the yield management techniques for airlines are not always applicable to hotels, for
instance, due to the feature of multiple-day stays. Bitran and Mondschein (1995) study the problem
of room allocation in the hotel industry. Given a fixed capacity, the problem is to find revenue-
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maximizing policies for renting hotel rooms when customers arrive in a stochastic and dynamic
way from different market segments within a finite horizon. Bitran and Gilbert (1996) give an
excellent description of the problem of managing reservations in hotels. They present a model that
combines a tactical reservation control problem and an operational capacity allocation problem.
Carvell and Quan (2005) and Rohlfs and Kimes (2007) discuss hotels using the best available rate
strategies that share the feature modeled in our paper for quoting the room price for each day. Other
papers studying the hotel reservation problem include Rothstein (1974), Ladany (1976, 1996), and
Liberman and Yechiali (1978). None of these papers consider the dynamic pricing of hotel rooms.
Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) study a continuous-time dynamic pricing model for a single
perishable product over a finite horizon. Extending this work, Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) model
firms that sell a set of products over a finite horizon. They assume that firms have inventories of a
set of resources that are used to produce the products. The problem is to price the finished products
so that the expected revenue is maximized over the sales horizon. The formulations in Gallego and
van Ryzin (1994, 1997) assume a one-to-one relationship between the demand rate and the price.
This assumption ensures the existence of a null price for implicitly turning off a product’s demand
when one of its resources is unavailable. We refer the reader to Bitran and Caldentey (2003) and
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for excellent reviews on dynamic pricing.
Recently, Zhang and Weatherford (2016) investigate the applicability of the Gallego and van
Ryzin (1997) model for pricing multiple-day stays in the hotel industry using data from a major ho-
tel. In this model, stays with different arrival and departure dates correspond to different products,
and room capacities of different days correspond to inventories of different resources. The authors
benchmark several popular heuristics based on a fluid approximation and approximate dynamic
programming. An approximate dynamic programming heuristic performs best and their results
show that the length of multiple-day stays has an impact on the performance of the heuristics.
In contrast to the product-pricing models above, we introduce a resource-pricing formulation
motivated by the observed dynamic pricing practice of some prominent hotels (see §1). Specifically,
we study hotels that determine the booking prices of individual days (resources) in the service
horizon and dynamically update these prices. For example, the total booking price for a customer
staying from Monday to Wednesday is the sum of the daily booking prices for Monday, Tuesday,
and Wednesday. The demand rate of a multi-day stay (product) thus depends on multiple resource
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prices. This one-to-many relationship between the product demand and resource prices generally
voids the existence of a null price when using a linear demand model. Null prices do exist under
nonlinear models (for example, exponential arrival intensity) but the optimization problem to find
room prices under such models is nonconvex. These features are unique to resource pricing and
make our model different from the product-pricing model studied in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997).
Deterministic fluid approximation heuristics have been proposed for approximating stochastic
optimization formulations arising in the dynamic pricing literature. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994,
1997) propose early heuristics of this type, and provide a static pricing policy and an upper bound
on the optimal revenue. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) discuss related generalizations. There is also
substantial work on using deterministic models in network revenue management where the product
price is fixed (see, for example, Bertsimas and Popescu, 2003, and Jasin and Kumar, 2013). Our
fluid approximation is non-convex and needs to explicitly account for the possibility of customer
rejections, which makes it different from the one in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994, 1997).
Adelman (2007), Zhang and Adelman (2009), Tong and Topaloglu (2014), and Kirshner and Ne-
diak (2015) use approximate dynamic programming, specifically approximate linear programming,
for solving airline network revenue management problems. These papers formulate the stochastic
dynamic program arising in their application as a linear program, and apply an affine approxima-
tion to the value function. Piecewise-linear and non-separable value function approximations have
also been considered for network revenue management (Farias and Van Roy, 2007, Kunnumkal and
Talluri, 2011, Zhang, 2011, and Zhang and Lu, 2011). Constraint generation or problem reductions
are used to solve the resultant approximate linear program. We also use approximate linear pro-
gramming with an affine value function approximation. However, our constraint generation strategy
is different from the aforementioned papers due to model-specific nonlinearities.
3 Problem formulation
In §3.1 we present a Markov decision process formulation for the dynamic pricing problem for
hotels and approach its solution via stochastic dynamic programming. In §3.2 we discuss differences
between our formulation and dynamic product-pricing problems studied in the literature.
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3.1 A Markov decision process formulation
Consider a hotel with a service horizon of N days. The hotel sells its available capacity over the
service horizon in advance during a pricing-booking horizon. We divide the pricing-booking horizon
into T periods. Each period t has length δt, which is assumed to be sufficiently small that at most
one request for booking prices occurs in the period. This is an approximation of a continuous-
time model in which decisions are made only at random instants when requests arrive. Under
this approximate model, decisions are made at discrete time periods. This model serves practical
purposes well because we can approach the results of the continuous-time model by reducing δt.
As is standard in the revenue management literature, we assume that there are (i) no cancellations
once a reservation is made, and (ii) no group reservations, that is, each reservation requires exactly
one room per day of stay. For convenience, define T = {1, 2, . . . , T}, N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, and
UV = {(u, v)|(u, v) ∈ N ×N , v ≥ u}.
Suppose the hotel has a total capacity of C rooms. We define booking time t as the start of period
t in the pricing-booking horizon. The state of the hotel at booking time t can be represented by the
capacity vector xt = (xt,1, xt,2, . . . , xt,N )
′, where xt,i is the number of rooms available for day i at
booking time t. Each capacity vector xt falls in the state space X = {x ∈ ZN |0 ≤ xi ≤ C, i ∈ N}.
Let pt,i denote the price for a room on day i at booking time t. At booking time t we determine
the booking prices pt = (pt,1, pt,2, . . . , pt,N )
′ based on the state xt.
Define class u-v, 1 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ N , as a group of customers that would like to stay from day u to
day v (they will check out in the morning of day v+ 1). Let λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt) denote the arrival intensity of
class u-v. A class u-v customer may make a reservation only if there is at least one room available
for all days in the interval [u, v]. We use the linear arrival intensity function
λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt) := a
[u,v]
t − b[u,v]t ×
v∑
i=u
pt,i/(v − u+ 1), (1)
where a
[u,v]
t denotes the base demand of class u-v in period t, and b
[u,v]
t denotes the price sensitivity
factor of class u-v in period t with respect to the average daily booking price. As discussed in §1,
the dependence of the arrival rate on the average price over the multiple-day stay in Equation (1)
is consistent with this average price being the main displayed price on booking websites, and the
customer’s perception of an average price being fair when it is based on room prices for each day.
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We model room availability using an indicator function A[u,v](xt) that equals 1 if there is at
least one room available on every day in the interval [u, v], and 0 otherwise. Given the state xt and
the booking prices pt at the start of period t, the actual reservations follow a Poisson process with
a rate of
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt) := A
[u,v](xt)
(
a
[u,v]
t − b[u,v]t ×
v∑
i=u
pt,i/(v − u+ 1)
)
. (2)
We maintain nonnegative reservation rates by defining the set of feasible booking price vectors
as Pt(xt) = {pt ∈ RN+ |
∑v
i=u pt,i/(v − u + 1) ≤ a[u,v]t /b[u,v]t , (u, v) ∈ UV and A[u,v](xt) = 1}. The
constraints in this set enforce the nonnegativity of the arrival rate for each demand class with at
least one room available for the entire duration of stay, which implies non-negative reservation rates
because the indicator function A[u,v](xt) automatically makes the reservation rate zero when the
hotel runs out of rooms on any day within the duration of stay.
We are now ready to formulate the dynamic pricing problem. The total reservation rate in
period t is Λt(xt,pt) :=
∑N
u=1
∑N
v=u λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt). Recall our assumption that δt is sufficiently small
such that we have at most one request (thus, at most one reservation) in each period t. Moreover,
the probabilities of having 0 and 1 reservation in period t are 1 − Λt(xt,pt)δt and Λt(xt,pt)δt
respectively. Define Vt(xt) as a value function that represents the maximum expected revenue from
our Markov decision process, when starting with room capacities xt at the start of period t and
continuing until the end of the pricing-booking horizon. This value function can be determined by
solving the following stochastic dynamic program (SDP):
Vt(xt) = max
pt∈Pt(xt)
{
(1− Λt(xt,pt)δt)Vt+1(xt) +
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt
(
v∑
i=u
pt,i + Vt+1(xt − eu,v)
)}
; (3)
where eu,v is an N -dimensional vector with all its entries equal to 0 except for the u-th to v-th
entries equal to 1. The boundary conditions are VT+1(xt) = 0,xt ∈ X ;Vt(0) = 0, t ∈ T .
The above stochastic dynamic program has multi-dimensional state and action spaces that grow
with N . To better understand the challenges of solving Problem (3), we present it in a format that
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facilitates analysis:
Vt(xt) = Vt+1(xt) + max
pt∈Pt(xt)
{ft(xt,pt)} ; (4)
where
ft(xt,pt) :=
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pt,i −4V [u,v]t+1 (xt)
)
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt, (5)
and 4V [u,v]t+1 (xt) := Vt+1(xt) − Vt+1(xt − eu,v). The term 4V [u,v]t+1 (xt) is called the marginal value
of capacity for interval [u, v], and can be interpreted as the expected future revenue that can be
gained if the hotel does not sell a room for the interval. Thus, the term
∑v
i=u pt,i −4V [u,v]t+1 (xt) in
Equation (5) can be interpreted as the hotel’s net gain if a room is reserved for interval [u, v].
The benefit of the form of Problem (4) is that ft(xt,pt) is a quadratic function of the booking
prices pt. We further establish the following property of the function ft(xt,pt).
Theorem 1. For any given xt, the function ft(xt,pt) is concave in pt.
For any given xt at booking time t, Theorem 1 shows that we can efficiently compute optimal
booking prices using standard optimization procedures. In other words, the multi-dimensional
action space does not pose a challenge. Nevertheless, Problem (4) is still prohibitively hard to solve
due to the multi-dimensional state space.
3.2 Differences between resource- and product-pricing models
The Markov decision process formulation (3) prices resources under a linear arrival rate model
and differs conceptually from the product-pricing models found in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994,
1997) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) when employing an analogous linear model. A consequence
of this difference is that λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt) is non-invertible (the price for a room on day i, pt,i, appears in the
arrival intensity functions of multiple u-v classes) when λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt) takes the linear form in Equation
(1). Therefore, unlike in the product-pricing setting, a large “null” price is unavailable in general to
implicitly shut off demand for a product when resource capacity is unavailable. This results in the
need of an explicit indicator function A[u,v](xt) in Equation (2) to model capacity availability. We
explain using a special case with N = 3 why implicit capacity control can fail in the resource-pricing
setting.
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For N = 3, there are six classes 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, 1-2, 2-3, and 1-3. Equation (1) for classes 1-1,
2-2, and 3-3 becomes λ¯
[i,i]
t (pt,i) = a
[i,i]
t − b[i,i]t pt,i, for i = 1, 2, 3. We can use these equations to
eliminate prices from the formulation and obtain an intensity control problem as done in Gallego
and van Ryzin (1994, 1997). Using the substitution pt,i =
a
[i,i]
t − λ¯[i,i]t
b
[i,i]
t
in Equation (1), the demand
for classes [1, 2], [2, 3], and [1, 3] is
λ¯
[1,2]
t = a
[1,2]
t −
b
[1,2]
t
2
(
a
[1,1]
t
b
[1,1]
t
+
a
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
)
+
b
[1,2]
t
2
(
λ¯
[1,1]
t
b
[1,1]
t
+
λ¯
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
)
; (6)
λ¯
[2,3]
t = a
[2,3]
t −
b
[2,3]
t
2
(
a
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
+
a
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
+
b
[2,3]
t
2
(
λ¯
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
+
λ¯
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
; (7)
λ¯
[1,3]
t = a
[1,3]
t −
b
[1,3]
t
3
(
a[1,1]
b[1,1]
+
a[2,2]
b
[2,2]
t
+
a
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
+
b
[1,3]
t
3
(
λ¯
[1,1]
t
b
[1,1]
t
+
λ¯
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
+
λ¯
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
. (8)
Consider the case where capacity on days 1 and 3 are zero but the capacity for day 2 is nonzero.
Since capacity is zero on days 1 and 3, it follows that λ¯
[1,1]
t = λ¯
[3,3]
t = λ¯
[1,2]
t = λ¯
[2,3]
t = λ¯
[1,3]
t = 0.
This zeroing out of arrivals can be achieved by adding constraints λ¯
[i,i]
t ≤ xi, for i = 1, 2, 3, and
λ¯
[u,v]
t ≤ λ¯[i,i]t , for i = u, . . . , v and (u, v) ∈ UV. Enforcing these conditions in Equations (6)–(8) gives
the following equalities involving λ¯
[2,2]
t :
λ¯
[2,2]
t = b
[2,2]
t
((
a
[1,1]
t
b
[1,1]
t
+
a
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
)
− 2a
[1,2]
t
b
[1,2]
t
)
;
λ¯
[2,2]
t = b
[2,2]
t
((
a
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
+
a
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
− 2a
[2,3]
t
b
[2,3]
t
)
;
λ¯
[2,2]
t = b
[2,2]
t
((
a
[1,1]
t
b
[1,1]
t
+
a
[2,2]
t
b
[2,2]
t
+
a
[3,3]
t
b
[3,3]
t
)
− 3a
[1,3]
t
b
[1,3]
t
)
.
Clearly λ¯
[2,2]
t is over-specified in general, which shows that a set of “null” prices does not exist to
handle the case of zero capacity on days 1 and 3 and nonzero capacity on day 2. In other words,
an explicit use of the indicator function A[u,v](xt) in our formulation to account for the availability
of resource capacity is necessary even for this simple case of N = 3.
The absence of a null price above can be alleviated by replacing the linear arrival rate model
(1) by a nonlinear model that, for example, truncates this linear arrival rate below at zero or is
based on an exponential arrival intensity. Under these specifications, explicit capacity control is not
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necessary but the problem of finding the optimal room prices at a given period t and room capacities
xt becomes a nonconvex optimization problem. Instead, as shown in Theorem 1, computing room
prices in our formulation requires solving a tractable concave optimization problem, which justifies
our use of a linear arrival intensity model.
We briefly describe the room pricing formulation with an exponential intensity model of the form
λˆ
[u,v]
t (pt) := e
−∑vi=u pt,i (our arguments carry over to other exponential forms as well) to highlight the
aforementioned difficulty of computing room prices when using a nonlinear arrival intensity model.
Under this specification, setting the booking price to infinity for a day i with no available rooms
forces the arrival intensity of all classes including day i to zero. In period t, the condition that a cus-
tomer can make a reservation only if there is at least one room available can be modeled by restrict-
ing prices to the following set: P¯t(xt) :=
{
pt ∈ RN+ |λˆ[u,v]t (pt)δt ≤ xt,i, ∀i = {u, . . . , v}, (u, v) ∈ UV
}
.
These constraints are convex in pt and linear in xt. Defining Λˆt(pt) :=
∑N
u=1
∑N
v=u λˆ
[u,v]
t (pt), the
analogue of formulation (4) is V¯t(xt) = V¯t+1(xt) + maxpt∈P¯t(xt)
{
f¯t(xt,pt)
}
, where V¯t(x) denotes
the value function under the exponential arrival intensity at period t given room inventory vector xt;
4V¯ [u,v]t+1 (xt) := V¯t+1(xt)−V¯t+1(xt−eu,v); and f¯t(xt,pt) :=
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pt,i −4V¯ [u,v]t+1 (xt)
)
λˆ
[u,v]
t (pt)δt.
The boundary conditions are V¯T+1(xt) = 0,xt ∈ X ; V¯t(0) = 0, t ∈ T . Unfortunately, computing the
prices under the exponential arrival intensity is intractable due to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given any xt, f¯t(xt,pt) is non-concave in pt.
Given the high dimensional state space and the non-convexity caused by explicit capacity control
in formulation (3), a natural question is whether the existing deterministic models in revenue man-
agement (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994, Bitran and Caldentey, 2003, §5.4 of Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004) can be leveraged to approximate our problem. These “fluid” approximations are substantially
easier to solve than the original stochastic version of the problem because they replace the random
arrivals of class u-v reservations by their respective expected arrival rates. For instance, consider
the well-known fluid approximation in §5.4.1 of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) for pricing products
that require multiple resources with finite capacities. The dual variables of the resource capacity
constraints in this formulation may be used as resource prices. However, as explained next, these
dual prices are poor surrogates for the resource prices. Consider a situation where there is abundant
capacity for each resource so that the demand of every class is satisfied. In this case, the marginal
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values of the resource capacities (the dual prices) will be zero but the optimal revenue from selling
rooms is clearly nonzero. In other words, the dual prices represent the marginal values of resource
capacities as opposed to the resource prices that maximize the revenue from using the existing re-
source capacities. Therefore, the resource prices in our formulation are conceptually different, which
motivates us to propose a fluid approximation specific to our resource-pricing formulation (3) in §5.
4 Understanding the optimal pricing policy
We study the behavior of the optimal pricing policy in tractable special cases to provide some
insights into room pricing on each day. In §4.1 we compare the optimal pricing policy and the
pricing policy based on a single-day decomposition in a two-day setting. In §4.2 we investigate the
room pricing profile around peak demand events assuming that the demand data is symmetric.
4.1 Comparison with a single-day decomposition
Consider a hypothetical situation in which a class u-v customer is willing to make a partial
reservation when the hotel cannot fully accommodate all days on the itinerary [u, v]. We call this
the single-day decomposition (SDD) because under this approach a class u-v customer is considered
as a group of distinct customers indexed as k = u, . . . , v. Each customer k in the group wants to
stay only on a single day k in the service horizon, for k = u, . . . , v.
Under the single-day decomposition, the problem of maximizing expected revenue can be sepa-
rated into N independent sub-problems, each corresponding to a different day. The technical benefit
of this approach is that each sub-problem is a one-dimensional stochastic dynamic program, and
hence is considerably easier to solve than the original problem (4). Under this approach, the ap-
proximate model is described as follows. Given that there are xt,i rooms available and the booking
price is pt,i for day i at the start of period t, we assume that the reservations for day i follow a
Poisson process with a rate of λit (xt,i, pt,i) := I (xt,i > 0)
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i
(
a
[u,v]
t − b[u,v]t pt,i
)
, where I(·)
equals 1 if · is true, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the probabilities of having 0 and 1 reservation,
respectively, for day i in period t are 1− λit(xt,i, pt,i)δt and λit(xt,i, pt,i)δt.
Let pmaxt,i :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i a
[u,v]
t /
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i b
[u,v]
t . Given that there are xt,i rooms available for
day i at the start of period t, define the value function V it (xt,i) as the maximum expected revenue
for day i under the single-day decomposition from period t until the end of the pricing-booking
horizon. The value function V it (xt,i) can be determined by solving the following stochastic dynamic
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program:
V it (xt,i) = max
0≤pt,i≤pmaxt,i
{(
1− λit(xt,i, pt,i)δt
)
V it+1(xt,i) + λ
i
t(xt,i, pt,i)δt
(
pt,i + V
i
t+1(xt,i − 1)
)}
; (9)
with boundary conditions V iT+1(xt,i) = 0, xt,i ∈ [0, C] and V it (0) = 0, t ∈ T ; i ∈ N .
Problem (9) can be rewritten as V it (xt,i) = V
i
t+1(xt,i) + max0≤pt,i≤pmaxt,i
{
f it (xt,i, pt,i)
}
, where
f it (xt,i, pt,i) :=
(
pt,i −4V it+1(xt,i)
)
λit(xt,i, pt,i)δt, (10)
and 4V it+1(xt,i) := V it+1(xt,i)−V it+1(xt,i−1), which is called the expected marginal value of capacity
for day i. It is straightforward to see that f it (xt,i, pt,i) is a concave quadratic function of pt,i. Given
a state xt at the start of period t, the problem is to maximize f
i
t (xt,i, pt,i) subject to 0 ≤ pt,i ≤ pmaxt,i ,
for i ∈ N . Solving the first-order conditions ∂f it (xt,i, pt,i)/∂pt,i = 0, the booking prices in each
period t under the single-day decomposition can be obtained as follows:
pst,i =
ait + b
i
t4V it+1(xt,i)
2bit
; (11)
where ait :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i a
[u,v]
t and b
i
t :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i b
[u,v]
t , for i ∈ N . Since f it (xt,i, pt,i) is a concave
function of pt,i, set p
s
t,i = 0 if the right hand side of Equation (11) is negative, and set p
s
t,i = p
max
t,i if
the right hand side of Equation (11) is larger than pmaxt,i , for i ∈ N .
We now contrast the single-day decomposition pricing policy and the optimal pricing policy for
the case of N = 2. Let p∗t,1 and p∗t,2 denote the optimal prices on days 1 and 2, respectively.
Proposition 2. For N = 2 an optimal solution to Problem (3) in period t ∈ T has the following
properties:
(1) p∗t,1 increases with a
[1,1]
t and a
[1,2]
t , but decreases with a
[2,2]
t ;
(2) p∗t,2 increases with a
[2,2]
t and a
[1,2]
t , but decreases with a
[1,1]
t .
Proposition 2 implies that, for N = 2, if the demand of single-day stays for day i increases, then
the hotel should not only raise the booking price for day i, but also lower the booking price for
day j (6= i). This is to exploit the increasing demand for a certain day, but maintain an attractive
average daily booking price for two-day stays. If the demand of two-day stays increases, then the
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hotel should raise the booking prices for both days.
In contrast, from Equations (11) the booking prices under the single-day decomposition for
N = 2 are
pst,1 =
∑2
v=1 a
[1,v]
t +
∑2
v=1 b
[1,v]
t 4V 1t+1(xt,1)
2
∑2
v=1 b
[1,v]
t
,
pst,2 =
∑2
u=1 a
[u,2]
t +
∑2
u=1 b
[u,2]
t 4V 2t+1(xt,2)
2
∑2
u=1 b
[u,2]
t
.
It is worth noting that pst,1 is independent of a
[2,2]
t and p
s
t,2 is independent of a
[1,1]
t . The optimal
pricing policy characterized in Proposition 2 captures the interaction of p∗t,1 and a
[2,2]
t , and the
interaction of p∗t,2 and a
[1,1]
t . These interactions are missing under the single-day decomposition.
Similarly, both the optimal booking prices p∗t,1 and p∗t,2 at period t are nonlinear functions of the
price sensitivity factors b
[1,1]
t , b
[1,2]
t , and b
[2,2]
t , whereas p
s
t,1 and p
s
t,2 are independent of b
[2,2]
t and b
[1,1]
t ,
respectively, under the single-day decomposition.
Proposition 3 highlights a difference in the sensitivity of prices to changes in demand under the
optimal policy and the single-day decomposition. It can be shown by simple algebra and thus the
proof is omitted. Let 4p∗t := p∗t,2 − p∗t,1 and 4pst := pst,2 − pst,1.
Proposition 3. For N = 2 if the hotel will not run out of rooms and b
[u,v]
t equals a constant b for all
(u, v) ∈ UV, then (1) 4p∗t is proportional to a
[2,2]
t −a[1,1]t
2b ; and (2) 4pst is proportional to
a
[2,2]
t −a[1,1]t
4b .
Proposition 3 implies that under both approaches, the gap between the booking prices for days 1
and 2 is proportional to the difference a
[2,2]
t − a[1,1]t . Furthermore, under the optimal policy the
sensitivity of this gap to the demands for single-day stays (a
[1,1]
t and a
[2,2]
t ) is two times of that
under the single-day decomposition.
In summary, the revenue generated by the single-day decomposition and the optimal policy may
differ as a result of the missing interactions and sensitivity differences highlighted using the simple
N = 2 case. In addition, the single-day decomposition does not correctly account for the capacity
needed to satisfy a multi-day stay request and may thus drastically overestimate the expected
revenue for the hotel. We expect this overestimation to happen particularly when the supply of
rooms is tight or when demand exhibits significant inter-day variability. Our numerical study in §7
explores the revenue impact of these differences by comparing the single-day decomposition with
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heuristics discussed in §5–6 that account for multiple-day stays.
4.2 Room pricing for peak-demand events
Hotels often encounter a situation where the demands on certain days are substantially higher
than others, for example, due to a conference, a sporting event, or public holidays. How should
hotels price rooms when the service horizon includes peak-demand events? We provide analysis of
special cases to shed light on this question, where we assume that the input data and room capacity
vector are “reflective”. Define r(i) := N − i + 1, for i ∈ N . We say the input data is reflective if
a
[u,v]
t = a
[r(v),r(u)]
t and b
[u,v]
t = b
[r(v),r(u)]
t , for each (t, u, v) ∈ T × UV. Further, we say a capacity
vector xt is reflective if xt,i = xt,r(i), for all i = 1, . . . , bN/2c. This assumption allows us to isolate
the impact of peak-demand days and ensures analytical tractability.
Proposition 4 establishes that the symmetry in the input data and capacity vector extends to
the value function and optimal room prices.
Proposition 4. If the input data is reflective then the following hold:
1. For capacity vectors x1t and x
2
t , if x
1
t,i = x
2
t,r(i), for all t ∈ T , i ∈ N , then Vt
(
x1t
)
= Vt
(
x2t
)
.
2. For a given period t and reflective room capacity vector, the optimal room price vector is also
reflective, that is, it satisfies pt,i = pt,r(i), for i = 1, . . . , bN/2c.
Proposition 4 supports the use of a reflective pricing policy over the service horizon when the
demand is reflective, which reduces the number of prices computed for each period by roughly
fifty percent. Indeed, the input demand data is unlikely to be reflective in practice. Nevertheless
assuming reflective room prices around a peak-demand event could lead to a potentially effective
heuristic when (i) the peak-demand event can be centered by choosing the service (planning) horizon
appropriately; and (ii) the demand on the days of the event are relatively stable compared to non-
peak days. We numerically test a heuristic that enforces reflective room prices in §7 and find that
it works well.
We now turn to understanding how prices in a reflective pricing profile change as a result of a
peak-demand event by focusing on the case of N = 8. We consider two events intended to model
a public holiday and a conference. The public-holiday and conference events have peak demand
classes 4-5 and 3-6 respectively. We model each of these events by increasing the base demand of the
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peak-demand class by a factor of α > 1 and use a constant base demand of a for the other classes.
Specifically, the base demands a
[4,5]
t in the public-holiday case and a
[3,6]
t in the conference case is
αa. We assume the demand sensitivity b
[u,v]
t is equal to a constant b for all classes. Proposition 5
highlights the sensitivity of prices to α for both events.
Proposition 5. For N = 8, assume for a given t that the capacity vector xt is reflective and strictly
positive. The following hold:
1. Public holiday: If b
[u,v]
t = b for all (u, v) ∈ UV, a[u,v]t = a for all (u, v) ∈ UV \ {(4, 5)},
a
[4,5]
t = αa with α > 1, and the optimal room rate vector pt is in the interior of Pt(xt), then
∂pt,3/∂α < ∂pt,2/∂α < ∂pt,1/∂α < 0 and ∂pt,4/∂α > maxi=1,...,3 |∂pt,i/∂α|.
2. Conference: If b
[u,v]
t = b for all (u, v) ∈ UV, a[u,v]t = a for all (u, v) ∈ UV \ {(3, 6)}, a[3,6]t = αa
with α > 1, and the optimal room rate vector pt is in the interior of Pt(xt), then ∂pt,2/∂α <
∂pt,1/∂α < 0, and ∂pt,3/∂α > ∂pt,4/∂α > maxi=1,2 |∂pt,i/∂α|.
For the public-holiday event, the booking prices increase with α for peak days and decrease
with α for non-peak days. Interestingly, (i) the price increase on peak days is larger than the price
decrease on non-peak days, and (ii) the decrease in the booking price is larger for the non-peak
days closer to a peak day. The price sensitivity of the conference event also shares these features.
However, a new pattern emerges with respect to the price changes on the peak days. Specifically,
the prices increase by a larger amount on the first and the last peak days, but by a smaller amount
on the intermediate peak days.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the insights on price sensitivity using a simple example with
a = 1.0, b = 0.01, α = 8, δt = 0.001, and ∆V
[u,v]
t+1 (xt) = 0, for (t, u, v) ∈ T × UV, that is, the price
profile corresponds to a state with abundant room inventory: xt,i ≥ T for i ∈ N . We compute the
prices using their closed-form expressions in the proof of Proposition 5 in Online Appendix A. The
dotted line in each figure corresponds to the pricing profile when there is no peak-demand class. The
solid lines in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the pricing profiles in the presence of the public-holiday
and conference events respectively. Comparing the dotted and solid lines shows that the difference
in booking price can be substantial.
To summarize, our analysis suggests that if the base demand of a class u-v, where v > u + 1,
is especially strong, the hotel should significantly increase the booking prices for the “boundary”
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Figure 3: Booking price sensitivities for (a) public-holiday and (b) conference events.
peak days u and v, but should increase by less the booking prices for the intermediate peak days
u + 1 to v − 1. This is to exploit the strong demand of class u-v but to attract customers staying
on intermediate peak days such as classes u′-v′, where u′ ≥ u + 1 and v′ ≤ v − 1. On the other
hand, the booking prices for the immediately-adjacent, non-peak days u − 1 and v + 1 should be
substantially lowered. This is to attract customers staying on both peak and non-peak days such
as classes u′-u, where u′ ≤ u− 1, and classes v-v′, where v′ ≥ v + 1. We thus recommend the rules
in Table 1 for hotel managers. Although these rules do not determine the booking prices in detail,
they provide a simple guideline to handle a demand surge from a specific customer class. They are
potentially easier to interpret and implement. Moreover, this structure can be imposed on a pricing
heuristic, which we describe in §6.2.
Table 1: Simple rules to handle a high-demand customer class u-v.
To maximize the revenue, follow both of the rules below.
Increase booking prices : Significantly raise the booking prices for days u and v. If
the interval [u, v] spans more than two days (v > u + 1), then raise by less the
booking prices for days u+ 1 to v − 1.
Decrease booking prices : Significantly lower the booking prices for days u − 1 and
v + 1.
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5 Fluid approximation heuristic: FAH
Computing the optimal booking prices using the exact formulation (3) quickly becomes in-
tractable as the size of the problem grows. Motivated by the discussion at the end of §3.2, we
introduce here a fluid approximation for our SDP (3) that directly price the resources. Recall that
the arrival intensity of class u-v in period t is λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt) ≡ a[u,v]t − b[u,v]t
∑v
i=u pt,i
v−u+1 . We use η
[u,v]
t to
represent the rate of class u-v requests that are rejected in period t. In other words, the effective
number of class u-v reservations in period t is
(
λ¯
[u,v]
t (pt)− η[u,v]t
)
δt. Let ηt denote the vector(
η¯
[u,v]
t ,∀(u, v) ∈ UV
)
. Let p and η denote (p1,p2, . . . ,pT ) and (η1,η2, . . . ,ηT ) respectively. Our
fluid approximation is the following mathematical program:
max
p,η
T∑
t=1
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
u∑
i=u
pt,i
)(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i − η[u,v]t
)
δt (12)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
i∑
u=1
N∑
v=i
(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i − η[u,v]t
)
δt ≤ C, ∀i ∈ N , (13)
η
[u,v]
t ≤
(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i
)
, ∀t ∈ T , (u, v) ∈ UV, (14)
0 ≤ η[u,v]t ≤ a[u,v]t , ∀t ∈ T , (u, v) ∈ UV, (15)
0 ≤ pt,i, ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N . (16)
The decision variables in (12)-(16) are the price pt,i charged in period t for a room on day i and the
rejection rate η
[u,v]
t of class u-v in period t. The objective function (12) is the total revenue, where
the class u-v revenue component is the product of (i) the sum of prices charged during the period
of stay and (ii) the corresponding effective number of reservations. Constraints (13) make sure that
the number of rooms sold for day i is no larger than the number of rooms available. Conditions
(14) ensure that the expected rate of rejected requests in each class is no larger than its arrival
intensity. Constraints (15)–(16) specify bounds on the decision variables. We highlight that the
role of the variables η
[u,v]
t in the objective function and constraints is akin to the indicator function
A[u,v](x) that we use in (3) to control capacity explicitly. That is, both η
[u,v]
t and A
[u,v](x) allow
their respective models to reject reservations.
Formulation (12)–(16) has a non-concave objective function because of the product between
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the rejection variables η
[u,v]
t and the price variables pt,i. Removing the rejection variables from the
formulation may cause it to become infeasible because controlling the prices alone is insufficient
to switch off the demand for the days that run out of capacity, as discussed in §3.2. We thus fix
the rejection variables η
[u,v]
t to some pre-determined values η¯
[u,v]
t that ensure feasibility, and solve
the resultant restricted model, which is a convex program. For a given candidate rejection vector
η¯ = (η¯1, η¯2, . . . , η¯T ), we solve the following convex program:
max
p
T∑
t=1
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
[(
v∑
i=u
pt,i
)(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i
)
δt − η¯[u,v]t δt
v∑
i=u
pt,i
]
(17)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
i∑
u=1
N∑
v=i
(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i − η¯[u,v]t
)
δt ≤ C, ∀i ∈ N , (18)
η¯
[u,v]
t ≤
(
a
[u,v]
t −
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i
)
, ∀t ∈ T , (u, v) ∈ UV, (19)
0 ≤ pt,i, ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N . (20)
Formulation (17)–(20) has linear constraints. It has a concave objective function because its first
term is the same as the immediate reward in SDP (3), which we show to be concave in the proof of
Theorem 1, and its second term is linear in the prices.
We now discuss the intuition behind our approach for generating the candidate rejection vectors,
and then present a linear program for generating such vectors. The effective number of reservations
of class u-v can be reduced by either (i) increasing the relevant room prices and/or (ii) increasing the
number of rejected requests. The non-convex formulation (12)–(16) can be interpreted as trying to
determine a revenue-maximizing balance between these two strategies while satisfying the capacity
constraints. Our generation of candidate rejection vectors mimics this trade off using a weight
κ ∈ [0, 1] embedded in the following linear program:
max
p,η
T∑
t=1
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
[
κ
(
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pt,i
)
+ (1− κ)η[u,v]t
]
(21)
s.t. (13)− (16). (22)
The first and second terms in the objective (21) correspond to the reduction in class u-v demand due
to higher room prices and a higher rejection rate, respectively. We formalize our fluid approximation
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heuristic described above in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Fluid approximation heuristic
Inputs: Discretization size M .
Initialization: Set ∆κ = 1/M , κ = 0, E = ∅, p∗ = 0, and R∗ = 0.
While κ < 1 do:
(i) Solve the linear program (21)–(22) with weight κ to obtain a rejection vector η¯.
(ii) If η¯ 6∈ E then add η¯ to set E.
(iii) κ← κ+ ∆κ.
For each η¯ ∈ E do:
(i) Solve the convex program (17)–(20) and obtain a price vector p¯ and optimal revenue R¯.
(ii) If R¯ > R∗ then set p∗ = p¯ and R∗ = R¯.
Return p∗.
6 Approximate dynamic programming based heuristics
In this section, we consider two heuristics that account for the uncertain evolution of room
availability over time. These heuristics are based on the approximate dynamic programming ap-
proach that computes and uses an approximation V˜t(xt) instead of the exact value function Vt(xt)
to determine decisions (Bertsekas, 2012). In other words, the room price vector pt is computed by
solving
max
pt∈Pt(xt)
{
f˜t(xt,pt)
}
, (23)
where f˜t(xt,pt) :=
∑N
u=1
∑N
v=u
(∑v
i=u pt,i − V˜t+1(xt) + V˜t+1(xt − eu,v)
)
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt. Problem
(23) is a convex quadratic program because Pt(xt) is convex and f˜t(xt,pt) remains concave in pt
by Theorem 1 after replacing Vt+1(xt+1) by V˜t+1(xt+1). Thus, we can compute the booking prices
efficiently via Problem (23) once we have a value function approximation for each period.
6.1 A multiple-day heuristic: MDH
We consider a heuristic MDH that computes an approximation V˜t+1(xt+1) by assuming that
the booking prices are kept fixed at a value from period t+ 1 until the end of the pricing-booking
horizon (a similar strategy is adopted in the fixed-price heuristic by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994)).
Assume that the demand for day i in each period τ = t + 1, . . . , T follows a Poisson process with
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rate λ˜iτ (pτ,i) :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i a
[u,v]
τ − b[u,v]τ pτ,i. The demand for day i in period τ is a Poisson random
variable with mean λ˜iτ (pτ,i)δτ . Since the sum of Poisson random variables is still a Poisson random
variable (see Ross, 2000, page 58), the demand for day i from period t + 1 to period T can be
represented by a Poisson random variable Y it+1 with mean
∑T
τ=t+1 λ˜
i
τ (pτ,i)δτ .
Let V˜ it+1(xt+1,i, pt+1,i) denote the expected revenue generated by these Poisson arrivals from
period t + 1 until the end of the pricing-booking horizon, given that xt+1,i rooms are available for
day i and its booking price is pt+1,i at the start of period t + 1. We have V˜
i
t+1(xt+1,i, pt+1,i) =
pt+1,iE
[
min
{
xt+1,i, Y
i
t+1
}]
. Let V˜t+1(xt+1,pt+1) be the sum of expected revenue generated by the
demands for all days, given the state xt+1 and the booking prices pt+1 at the start of period t+ 1.
That is, V˜t+1(xt+1,pt+1) =
∑N
i=1 V˜
i
t+1(xt+1,i, pt+1,i). Our goal is to find p
∗
t+1 ∈ Pt+1(xt+1) such
that V˜t+1
(
xt+1,p
∗
t+1
)
=
∑N
i=1 V˜
i
t+1(xt+1,i, p
∗
t+1,i) ≥ V˜t+1(xt+1,pt+1), for all pt+1 ∈ Pt+1(xt+1).
Since there is no closed-form expression for p∗t+1, we find p∗t+1 numerically (see Gallego and van
Ryzin, 1994). We then set V˜t+1(xt+1) = V˜t+1
(
xt+1,p
∗
t+1
)
.
6.2 Approximate linear programming heuristics: ALPH and ALPH-3P
We also compute V˜t(xt) by solving an approximate linear program (ALP) (Schweitzer and Sei-
dmann, 1985, de Farias and Van Roy, 2003) of the SDP (3). We first derive this ALP and then
discuss heuristics to solve it.
6.2.1 Approximate linear program
We first formulate the SDP (3) as the following (infinite) linear program (Manne, 1960, Hern´andez-
Lerma and Lasserre, 1996):
min
V¯
V¯1(C1N ) (24)
s.t. V¯t(xt) ≥ (1− Λt(xt,pt)δt)V¯t+1(xt) +
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt
(
v∑
i=u
pi + V¯t+1(xt − eu,v)
)
,
∀(t,xt,pt) ∈ T × X × Pt(xt), (25)
V¯T+1(xT+1) = 0, ∀xT+1 ∈ X . (26)
The variables V¯t(xt) are surrogates for the value functions, and an optimal solution V¯
∗
t (xt) satisfies
V¯ ∗t (xt) = Vt(xt), for all (t,xt) ∈ T ×X . The objective function minimizes the value function at the
initial state C1N , where 1N is a vector of N ones (the initial state can be changed as required).
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Constraints (25)–(26) are closely related to the recursion of the SDP (3). They can be obtained by
changing the equality in (3) to an inequality and modeling the maximization over pt by an infinite
set of inequalities.
Solving (24)–(26) is not practical due to its exponentially many variables and infinitely many
constraints. We can reduce the number of variables in (24)–(26) by restricting their possible values.
Let θ and α denote the vectors (θt,∀t) and (αt,i, ∀t, i) respectively. We consider an affine restriction
V¯t(xt) = θt +
∑N
i=1 αt,ixt,i, which results in the following ALP:
min
θ,α
θ1 + C
N∑
i=1
α1,i (27)
s.t. θt +
N∑
i=1
αt,ixt,i ≥
(
θt+1 +
N∑
i=1
αt+1,ixt,i
)
+
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt
v∑
i=u
(pt,i − αt+1,i),
∀(t,xt,pt) ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} × X × Pt(xt), (28)
θT +
N∑
i=1
αT,ixT,i ≥
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
T (xT ,pT )δT
v∑
i=u
pT,i, ∀(xT ,pT ) ∈ X × PT (xT ). (29)
ALP (27)–(29) has T (N + 1) variables: θt, ∀t and αt,i, ∀(t, i). However, it has infinitely many
constraints. Thus, its solution can be approached by generating only a subset of constraints (see,
for example, Adelman, 2004, 2007) using Algorithm 2. The termination criteria in Algorithm
2 could include a maximum number of iterations and/or a minimum improvement in the ALP
objective. If one of the termination criteria is met before the ALP is solved to optimality (while
violated constraints exist), we still obtain a value function approximation. Thus, we can interpret
Algorithm 2 as an ALP solution heuristic that delivers an affine value function approximation
V˜t(xt) = θ
∗
t +
∑N
i=1 α
∗
t,ixt,i.
6.2.2 Constraint generation
A key element in the above ALP heuristic is the constraint generation problem. For a given
solution (θ,α), define the following functions that compute the difference between the right and
the left hand sides of the ALP constraints (28)–(29):
gt(xt,pt;θ,α) = (θt+1 − θt) +
N∑
i=1
(αt+1,i − αt,i)xt,i
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Algorithm 2: ALP heuristic
Inputs: Termination criteria
Initialization: Set k = 0.
While termination criteria are not met do:
(i) Solve a relaxation of ALP defined by a finite subset Ct of its constraints for each period t.
(ii) Given a solution θ∗t (k) and α∗t,i(k), ∀t, i, to this relaxation, solve a constraint generation
problem for each period t to identify the most violated constraint in (28)–(29) that is not in
Ct.
(iii) If there are no violated constraints, stop and return θ∗t (k) and α∗t,i(k), ∀t, i, as the ALP
optimal solution; otherwise, add the violated constraints to Ct, ∀t, and set k ← k + 1.
+
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt)δt
v∑
i=u
(pt,i − αt+1,i), ∀(t,xt,pt) ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} × X × Pt(xt);
gT (xT ,pT ;θ,α) = −θT −
N∑
i=1
αT,ixT,i +
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
λ
[u,v]
T (xT ,pT )δT
v∑
i=u
pT,i, ∀(xT ,pT ) ∈ X × PT (xT ).
Given a solution (θ,α) in an iteration, the most violated constraint for each period t ∈ T can be
generated by solving the constraint generation problem:
lt (θ,α) = max
(xt,pt)
gt(xt,pt;θ,α), (30)
where lt(θ,α) is the optimal objective function value. The above constraint generation problem
is non-convex in xt due to the indicator function in λ
[u,v]
t (xt,pt). Using binary variables to model
this indicator function leads to a mixed-integer program with cubic terms in the objective function.
Such optimization problems are highly intractable, and solving them exactly at each iteration of
the ALP heuristic is not practical. In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, ALPs formulated
with an affine value function approximation in existing revenue management applications give rise
to constraint generation problems that are either linear programs or mixed-integer linear programs
(see, for example, Adelman, 2004, 2007, and Zhang and Adelman, 2009). Thus, our application
appears to be more challenging.
Since finding the most violated constraint is too challenging, we approach the solution of prob-
lem (30) by solving convex quadratic programs and integer linear programs sequentially. These
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mathematical programs can be solved using off-the-shelf commercial solvers such as CPLEX and
GUROBI. At each step of the sequential procedure either xt or pt is fixed in gt(xt,pt), and the
maximization is performed over the domain of the remaining variable. For a given xˆt, the maxi-
mization problem over pt is the following simple quadratic program maxpt∈Pt(xˆt) gt(xˆt,pt), which
we label as Pt(xˆt). For a given pˆt, the maximization problem over xt is maxxt∈X gt(xt, pˆt). Defining
f
[u,v]
t (pt) :=
(
a
[u,v]
t − b[u,v]t
∑v
i=u pt,i
v−u+1
)
δt
∑v
i=u(pt,i−αt+1,i), we formulate this problem as the following
integer linear program labelled as Xt(pˆt):
max
xt,yt,γt
N∑
i=1
(αt+1,i − αt,i)xt,i +
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
γ
[u,v]
t f
[u,v]
t (pˆt)
s.t. yt,i ≥ xt,i
C
, ∀i ∈ N , (31)
yt,i ≤ xt,i, ∀i ∈ N , (32)
γ
[u,v]
t ≥
v∑
i=u
yt,i + u− v, ∀(u, v) ∈ UV, (33)
γ
[u,v]
t ≤ yt,i, ∀i ∈ {u, . . . , v}, (u, v) ∈ UV, (34)
xt,i ∈ {0, . . . , C}, ∀i ∈ N , (35)
yt,i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N , (36)
γ
[u,v]
t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ UV. (37)
The objective function of Xt(pˆt) models the function gt(xt, pˆt) by virtue of constraints (31)–(37).
Constraints (31)–(32) ensure that yi is equal to 1 if and only if xt,i is at least 1. Constraints (33)–
(34) require γ
[u,v]
t to equal 1 if and only if all days in the interval [u, v] are not out of rooms. Finally,
constraints (35)–(37) define the variable domains.
Our constraint generation heuristic identifies violated constraints by iteratively solving Pt(xˆt)
and Xt(pˆt) as outlined in Algorithm 3. We set the termination criteria to be a maximum number of
iterations and/or a minimum increase in constraint violation across successive iterations. We refer
to the ALP heuristic using this constraint generation heuristic as ALPH.
We also consider a modified version of ALPH, denoted as ALPH-3P, to validate the simple
pricing profile described in Table 1. We implement this profile using only three price levels p¯,
p¯+ ∆p1, and p¯−∆p2, where ∆p1,∆p2 ≥ 0: (i) prices on days u and v equal p¯+ ∆p1, (ii) prices on
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Algorithm 3: Constraint generation heuristic
Inputs: Termination criteria
Initialization: Set k = 0 and x∗,0t = C1N .
While termination criteria are not met do:
(i) Increment k: k ← k + 1.
(ii) Solve P
(
x∗,k−1t
)
and compute p∗,kt .
(iii) Solve X
(
p∗,kt
)
and compute x∗,kt .
Return
(
x∗,kt ,p
∗,k
t
)
.
days u − 1 and v + 1 equal p¯ −∆p2, (iii) prices on all the other days in the service horizon equal
p¯. Specifically, we add constraints enforcing this structure to Pt(xt), both when solving Pt(xˆt) in
Algorithm 3 and computing the booking prices in problem (23).
7 Numerical study
We numerically compare SDD, FAH, MDH, ALPH, and ALPH-3P on thirty-six instances de-
scribed below. We choose a service horizon with N = 7 (one week) and a pricing-booking horizon
with T = 300. We set the period length δt equal to 1/T . We consider the capacity C equal to 5,
50, and 200. For each of these capacity values, we design two sets of instances: The first models a
case of two public holidays within the service horizon by having peak demand from class 4-5, while
the second corresponds to a case of a 4-day conference, which we model with peak demand from
class 4-7.
For a given C, the instances in each set are obtained by choosing the base demand of the peak
class to be a multiple of a constant base demand assigned to all the non-peak classes. We call this
multiple the demand spike factor (DSF) and choose its value from the set {1, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20}. We
set the non-peak base demand as 4.4 for C = 5 and 10 for C = 50 and 200. This choice ensures
that the probability of an arrival in every period is less than 1.
We use simulations to evaluate our heuristics. Customers make reservations according to a
Poisson process with rate determined by Equation (2). We first substitute the booking prices given
by the heuristics into Equation (2), and then compute the average revenue over 1,000 simulation
runs. This average revenue is then compared across different heuristics, and against the optimal
policy for small instances. We use CPLEX V12.6 (IBM ILOG CPLEX 2014) to solve the linear,
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quadratic, and mixed-integer linear programs arising from our heuristics. When implementing
ALPH and ALPH-3P, we set the termination criteria of Algorithm 2 to a maximum iteration limit
of 500 and a minimum ALP objective function improvement of 0.01%. In addition, we set the
termination criteria of Algorithm 3 to a maximum iteration limit of 5 and a minimum increase in
the constraint violation of 0.01%. When implementing FAH, we set the discretization parameter
M equal to 50.
Tables 2 and 3 show the simulation results for the small public-holiday and conference instances,
respectively, with C = 5. The Exact-DP column in these tables display the average revenues when
using the optimal pricing policy. The remaining columns display the average revenues from the
remaining heuristics as an absolute value and as a percentage (in parentheses) relative to the
average revenue of Exact-DP. The standard errors of all the reported average revenue estimates in
Tables 2 and 3 are within 0.05% of the corresponding Exact-DP value.
Table 2: Average revenues for small public-holiday instances.
DSF Exact-DP ALPH ALPH-3P MDH SDD FAH
(% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP)
1 2597.24 2400.24 (92.41) 2317.74 (92.25) 2472.74 (95.21) 2476.43 (95.35) 2233.37 (86.00)
4 2416.00 2353.99 (97.43) 2355.70 (97.35) 2249.25 (93.10) 2234.55 (92.49) 1627.61 (67.37)
8 2336.34 2282.70 (97.70) 2264.58 (96.92) 2142.86 (91.72) 2115.79 (90.56) 1524.92 (65.27)
12 2280.68 2243.78 (98.38) 2229.66 (97.76) 2103.40 (92.23) 2072.25 (90.86) 1469.72 (64.44)
16 2258.57 2214.58 (98.05) 2210.80 (97.88) 2088.09 (92.45) 2048.08 (90.68) 1477.88 (65.43)
20 2262.85 2197.30 (97.10) 2177.20 (96.21) 2078.90 (91.87) 2037.62 (90.05) 1441.89 (63.72)
Table 3: Average revenues for small conference instances.
DSF Exact-DP ALPH ALPH-3P MDH SDD FAH
(% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP) (% Exact-DP)
1 2595.58 2390.31 (92.09) 2375.76 (91.53) 2469.36 (95.14) 2472.06 (95.24) 2212.35 (85.23)
4 2796.44 2741.52 (98.04) 2747.09 (98.24) 2690.88 (96.23) 2639.74 (94.40) 2115.05 (75.63)
8 2807.94 2752.10 (98.01) 2748.31 (97.88) 2668.53 (95.04) 2656.28 (94.60) 2119.39 (75.48)
12 2787.52 2750.15 (98.66) 2752.15 (98.73) 2680.42 (96.16) 2657.47 (95.33) 2135.14 (76.60)
16 2797.91 2740.92 (97.96) 2750.42 (98.30) 2674.21 (95.58) 2657.39 (94.98) 2196.50 (78.51)
20 2802.37 2740.82 (97.80) 2758.92 (98.44) 2672.77 (95.38) 2665.82 (95.13) 2185.62 (78.00)
The average revenue of MDH is at most 2% higher than that of SDD in Tables 2 and 3. ALPH
generally dominates the other heuristics on both the public-holiday and conference instances, except
for DSF = 1, where the SDD average revenue is roughly 3% higher than that of ALPH. As DSF
increases, the average revenues of MDH and SDD deteriorate significantly. The average revenue of
ALPH is up to 7% and 6% higher than that of SDD and MDH, respectively, on the small public-
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holiday instances, while these differences are between 2-3% on the small conference instances. ALPH
outperforms FAH by a substantially larger margin: up to 33% and 22% on the small public-holiday
and conference instances respectively.
It is interesting that the ALPH-3P average revenues are within 1% of the ALPH average rev-
enues, which provides some support for using the simple price profile in Table 1. Overall, the
dynamic heuristics that account for multiple-day stays (ALPH, ALPH-3P, and MDH) outperform
the dynamic heuristic based on the single-day decomposition (SDD) and the static fluid approxima-
tion (FAH) on the small instances. The superior performance of ALPH and ALPH-3P over MDH
can be attributed to the fixed-price assumption made in MDH, but not in ALPH and ALPH-3P.
The high sub-optimality of FAH suggests that dynamically accounting for uncertainty is critical
when capacity is limited.
Tables 4 and 5 report results for the larger public-holiday and conference instances, respectively,
with C = 50 and 200. Since we are unable to compute the optimal booking prices for these larger
instances, we use the average revenue of ALPH as our reference. Standard errors of the reported
average revenues are below 0.05% of the corresponding ALPH values. The performance of ALPH-3P
is within 1% of ALPH, which corroborates the use of the simple pricing profile in Table 1.
Table 4: Average revenues for large public-holiday instances.
Capacity DSF ALPH ALPH-3P MDH SDD FAH
(%ALPH) (%ALPH) (%ALPH) (%ALPH)
50 1 17591.84 17523.23 (99.61) 17529.31 (99.64) 17568.39 (99.87) 17604.21 (100.00)
50 4 17877.73 17875.58 (99.99) 17682.58 (98.91) 17365.58 (97.13) 16756.60 (93.73)
50 8 16385.32 16325.21 (99.63) 16354.10 (99.81) 16057.61 (98.00) 14420.50 (88.00)
50 12 15634.71 15611.63 (99.85) 15581.32 (99.66) 15293.87 (97.82)) 14015.96 (89.65)
50 16 15220.59 15160.37 (99.60) 15172.40 (99.68) 14855.30 (97.60) 13573.24 (89.18)
50 20 14910.04 14878.44 (99.79) 14853.16 (99.62) 14878.44 (99.79) 13189.28 (88.46)
200 1 21080.70 20901.35 (99.15) 21032.65 (99.77) 21074.70 (99.97) 20999.45 (99.61)
200 4 25129.45 25081.02 (99.81) 25070.88 (99.77) 24439.89 (97.26) 25284.30 (100.62)
200 8 32926.07 32886.24 (99.88) 32864.99 (99.81) 30378.00 (92.26) 32826.62 (99.70)
200 12 40915.11 40892.95 (99.95) 40758.92 (99.62) 37945.36 (92.74) 40990.92 (100.19)
200 16 47382.67 47112.17 (99.43) 46737.36 (98.64) 46325.84 (97.77) 47243.92 (99.71)
200 20 48476.60 48465.46 (99.98) 48058.03 (99.14) 48376.70 (99.79) 46162.52 (95.23)
The average revenue of MDH is up to 3% worse than ALPH on some large instances but its
performance for the most part does not deteriorate as much with DSF compared to the trend
observed on the small instances. In contrast, the performance of SDD continues to vary significantly
with DSF, and is up to 7% and 4% worse than ALPH on the large public-holiday and conference
instances respectively. FAH continues to exhibit significant sub-optimality, up to 12%, on the
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Table 5: Average revenues for large conference instances.
Capacity DSF ALPH ALPH-3P MDH SDD FAH
(%ALPH) (%ALPH) (%ALPH) (%ALPH)
50 1 17554.91 17516.29 (99.78) 17543.21 (99.93) 17645.83 (100.52) 17639.08 (100.48)
50 4 21083.49 20921.15 (99.23) 20882.91 (99.05) 20454.71 (97.02) 20729.52 (98.32)
50 8 22750.95 22711.88 (99.83) 22156.49 (97.39) 21941.21 (96.44) 20566.59 (90.40)
50 12 22875.00 22782.89 (99.60) 22221.75 (97.14) 22079.38 (96.52) 20576.91 (89.95)
50 16 22822.24 22760.96 (99.73) 22269.79 (97.58) 22127.13 (96.95) 20588.22 (90.21)
50 20 22762.67 22744.11 (99.92) 22315.74 (98.04) 22247.97 (97.74) 20752.00 (91.17)
200 1 20968.15 21107.85 (100.67) 20967.75 (100.00) 21047.30 (100.38) 21086.75 (100.57)
200 4 28393.82 28170.66 (99.21) 28429.14 (100.12) 27973.61 (98.52) 28259.00 (99.53)
200 8 42149.43 41816.57 (99.21) 42142.81 (99.98) 40301.61 (95.62) 42057.65 (99.78)
200 12 57586.13 57503.04 (99.86) 57507.92 (99.86) 55178.85 (95.82) 57613.84 (100.05)
200 16 72363.25 72465.23 (100.14) 72312.95 (99.93) 71426.54 (98.71) 72353.65 (99.99)
200 20 80277.06 80700.56 (100.53) 79232.40 (98.70) 80426.35 (100.19) 79847.58 (99.52)
instances with C = 50, but is comparable to ALPH on the instances with C = 200.
Overall, our ALP-based heuristics outperform the remaining methods. Moreover, ALPH, ALPH-
3P, MDH dominate SDD once again underscoring the importance of accounting for multiple-day
stays. The former heuristics also outperform FAH for C = 50, which indicates that accounting for
the uncertain evolution of room availability is important even at this moderate capacity value. In
contrast, the excellent performance of FAH for C = 200 suggests that it can be used for pricing
when capacity is substantially larger than the base demand. This observation is consistent with
the existing theory on fluid approximations in the product-pricing setting (Gallego and van Ryzin,
1994). Finally, the performance improvement of MDH on the large instances relative to the small
instances (Tables 2 and 3) suggests that the fixed-price assumption in MDH becomes benign as the
total capacity C increases.
8 Conclusion
Dynamic pricing of rooms on each day (resources) used by multiple-day stays (products) re-
quested by customers is a practice adopted by major hotel chains. We present a novel Markov
decision process formulation of this understudied problem. Analysis of tractable special cases of
our model sheds light on the sensitivity of room prices to demand parameters, and suggests room
pricing guidelines around peak-demand events such as public holidays and conferences. We de-
velop heuristics based on a fluid approximation and approximate linear programming to overcome
the intractability of computing an optimal pricing policy. We obtain the following insights based
on numerically benchmarking these heuristics against a single-day decomposition and a fixed-price
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heuristic: (i) Heuristics considering multiple-day stays outperform the single-day decomposition by
up to 7%, which underscores the importance of accounting for multiple-day stays. (ii) The approx-
imate linear programming heuristic based on an affine value function outperforms the fixed-price
heuristic by up to 6% despite the original problem being non-convex. (iii) The revenue loss from
using a pricing profile with three distinct price levels is less than 1%, thus suggesting that the pricing
policy can be simplified around peak-demand events consistent with our analysis. (iv) The fluid
approximation is suboptimal when room capacity is low, but progressively improves and becomes
near optimal as the capacity increases, an observation in line with the performance of such models
in the product-pricing setting.
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Online Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
For convenience, we omit the subscript t of xt and pt. Rewriting Equation (5), we have the objective
function
ft(x,p) = δt
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pi −4V [u,v]t+1 (x)
)
λ
[u,v]
t (x,p).
Since x are constant, they can be omitted in the analysis. As a result, we have
ft(p) = δt
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pi −4V [u,v]t+1
)
λ
[u,v]
t (p).
Taking the partial derivative of ft(p) with respect to pj , we have
∂ft(p)
∂pj
= δt
j∑
u=1
N∑
v=j
[
A[u,v]
(
a
[u,v]
t +
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 14V
[u,v]
t+1
)
− 2A[u,v] b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1
v∑
i=u
pi
]
.
Taking the partial derivative of ∂ft(p)/∂pj with respect to pk gives the second-order partial deriva-
tive
∂2ft(p)
∂pj∂pk
=

−2δt
j∑
u=1
N∑
v=k
A[u,v]
b
[u,v]
t
v−u+1 , if j ≤ k;
−2δt
k∑
u=1
N∑
v=j
A[u,v]
b
[u,v]
t
v−u+1 , otherwise;
= −2δt
min{j,k}∑
u=1
N∑
v=max{j,k}
A[u,v]
b
[u,v]
t
v − u+ 1 .
If day i is out of rooms, the problem can be partitioned into two separate subproblems. Each
subproblem can be solved individually. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume A[u,v] = 1
for all u and v.
The Hessian matrix H(N) of the objective function has elements
hjk = −2δt
min{j,k}∑
u=1
N∑
v=max{j,k}
φuv, j, k = 1, . . . , N ;
where φuv = b
[u,v]
t /(v − u+ 1) ≥ 0. Let G(N) be a matrix that has elements
gjk =
min{j,k}∑
u=1
N∑
v=max{j,k}
φuv, j, k = 1, . . . , N. (38)
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To show that the objective function is concave, it is equivalent to show that all principal minors of
matrix G(N) are nonnegative (see Winston (1994)).
We will prove by induction. For N = 1, |G(1)| = φ11 ≥ 0. The objective function is concave.
For N = 2,
G(2) =
[
φ11 + φ12 φ12
φ12 φ12 + φ22
]
.
All first principal minors are nonnegative. The second principal minor is (φ11 + φ12)(φ12 + φ22)−
φ212 ≥ 0. Thus, the objective function is concave for N = 2.
For N = 3,
G(3) =
 φ11 + φ12 + φ13 φ12 + φ13 φ13φ12 + φ13 φ12 + φ13 + φ22 + φ23 φ13 + φ23
φ13 φ13 + φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
 .
It is straightforward to show that all first and second principal minors are nonnegative. The third
principal minor is the determinant |G(3)|. By decomposing the first column of |G(3)| into two parts,
we have
|G(3)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ11 φ12 + φ13 φ13
0 φ12 + φ13 + φ22 + φ23 φ13 + φ23
0 φ13 + φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ12 + φ13 φ12 + φ13 φ13
φ12 + φ13 φ12 + φ13 + φ22 + φ23 φ13 + φ23
φ13 φ13 + φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
It is straightforward to show that the first determinant on the right hand side is nonnegative. For
the second determinant, subtracting row 1 from row 2 and subtracting column 1 from column 2, we
have
|G(3)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ12 + φ13 0 φ13
0 φ22 + φ23 φ23
φ13 φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Decomposing the first column of the determinant on the right hand side into two parts, we have
|G(3)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ12 0 φ13
0 φ22 + φ23 φ23
0 φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ13 0 φ13
0 φ22 + φ23 φ23
φ13 φ23 φ13 + φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
It is straightforward to show that the first determinant on the right hand side is nonnegative. For
the second determinant, subtracting row 1 from row 3, we have
|G(3)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ13 0 φ13
0 φ22 + φ23 φ23
0 φ23 φ23 + φ33
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0.
Thus, the objective function is concave for N = 3.
We have shown that |G(1)|, |G(2)|, and |G(3)| are nonnegative. We make the following induction
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hypothesis:
|G(n)| ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N − 1. (39)
We will show that |G(N)| ≥ 0. The proof is a generalization of the proof for the N = 3 case.
Equation (38) gives
|G(N)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
v=1
φ1v
N∑
v=2
φ1v
N∑
v=3
φ1v · · · φ1N
N∑
v=2
φ1v
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=2
φuv
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
2∑
u=1
φuN
N∑
v=3
φ1v
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
...
...
...
...
...
φ1N
2∑
u=1
φuN
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Call the above determinant the full determinant. Decomposing the first column into two parts, we
have
|G(N)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ11
N∑
v=2
φ1v
N∑
v=3
φ1v · · · φ1N
0
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=2
φuv
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
2∑
u=1
φuN
0
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
..
.
...
...
...
...
0
2∑
u=1
φuN
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
v=2
φ1v
N∑
v=2
φ1v
N∑
v=3
φ1v · · · φ1N
N∑
v=2
φ1v
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=2
φuv
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
2∑
u=1
φuN
N∑
v=3
φ1v
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
...
...
...
...
...
φ1N
2∑
u=1
φuN
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
For the second determinant on the right hand side, subtracting row 1 from row 2 and subtracting
column 1 from column 2, we have
|G(N)| =
φ11
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=2
φuv
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
2∑
u=1
φuN
2∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
..
.
..
.
..
.
...
2∑
u=1
φuN
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
v=2
φ1v 0
N∑
v=3
φ1v · · · φ1N
0
N∑
v=2
φ2v
N∑
v=3
φ2v · · · φ2N
N∑
v=3
φ1v
N∑
v=3
φ2v
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
...
...
...
...
...
φ1N φ2N
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
The first determinant on the right hand side can be transformed into a new determinant of a
corresponding (N − 1)-day problem. Each element of the new determinant is defined as
gjk =
min{j,k}∑
u=1
N−1∑
v=max{j,k}
Φuv, j, k = 1, . . . , N − 1;
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where
Φuv =
{
φ1,v+1 + φ2,v+1, if u = 1;
φu+1,v+1, if u = 2, . . . , N − 1;
for v = 1, . . . , N − 1. According to the induction hypothesis (39), this new determinant is nonneg-
ative. Thus, we have
|G(N)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
v=2
φ1v 0
N∑
v=3
φ1v · · · φ1N
0
N∑
v=2
φ2v
N∑
v=3
φ2v · · · φ2N
N∑
v=3
φ1v
N∑
v=3
φ2v
3∑
u=1
N∑
v=3
φuv · · ·
3∑
u=1
φuN
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
φ1N φ2N
3∑
u=1
φuN · · ·
N∑
u=1
φuN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Note that we have removed φ11 from the analysis. Let the determinant on the right hand side above
be the full determinant for the subsequent analysis.
Repeating a similar procedure, we can remove φ1j , for j = 2, . . . , N , from the analysis one at a
time. In short, for each iteration j, we remove φ1j by performing the following steps:
1. Decompose the first column of the full determinant into two parts. The first part corresponds
to a column that contains φ1j as its first element and zero for the remaining elements. Thus,
the full determinant can be decomposed into two determinants.
2. The first determinant can be transformed into a determinant corresponding to an (N−1)-day
problem. Under the induction hypothesis (39), this determinant is nonnegative and can be
removed from the analysis.
3. For the second determinant, subtract row 1 from row j+1 and subtract column 1 from column
j + 1. Let the resultant determinant be the full determinant for the next iteration.
For the last iteration N , the second determinant is zero and this concludes that |G(N)| ≥ 0.
Lastly, all n-th principal minors of G(N), for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, can be transformed into a
determinant corresponding to an n-day problem. According to the induction hypothesis (39), all
these principal minors are nonnegative. This proves that the objective function for an N -day
problem is concave.
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove the claim, it suffices to show that ∂
2f¯t(xt,pt)
∂p2t,1
can be positive. We have
∂f¯t(xt,pt)
∂pt,1
= δt
N∑
v=1
[
e−
∑v
i=1 pt,i
(
1 +4V¯ [1,v]t+1 (xt)−
v∑
i=1
pt,i
)]
,
and
∂2f¯t(xt,pt)
∂p2t,1
= δt
N∑
v=1
[
−e−
∑v
i=1 pt,i
(
2 +4V¯ [1,v]t+1 (xt)−
v∑
i=1
pt,i
)]
.
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Since pt ∈ RN+ , there exists pˆt such that the term 2 +4V¯ [1,v]t+1 (xt)−
∑v
i=1 pt,i < 0 for pt ≥ pˆt, which
implies that ∂
2f¯t(xt,pt)
∂p2t,1
is strictly positive in this range.
Proof of Proposition 2.
For convenience, we omit the subscript t of xt and pt. By solving the equations ∂ft(x,p)/∂p1 = 0
and ∂ft(x,p)/∂p2 = 0, we have
p∗1 =
{
A[1,2](x)b
[1,2]
t
[
A[1,1](x)
(
a
[1,1]
t + b
[1,1]
t 4V [1,1]t+1 (x)
)
−A[2,2](x)
(
a
[2,2]
t + b
[2,2]
t 4V [2,2]t+1 (x)
)]
+
2A[2,2](x)b
[2,2]
t ×
2∑
v=1
A[1,v](x)
(
a
[1,v]
t +
b
[1,v]
t
v
4V [1,v]t+1 (x)
)}
/d(x),
p∗2 =
{
A[1,2](x)b
[1,2]
t
[
A[2,2](x)
(
a
[2,2]
t + b
[2,2]
t 4V [2,2]t+1 (x)
)
−A[1,1](x)
(
a
[1,1]
t + b
[1,1]
t 4V [1,1]t+1 (x)
)]
+
2A[1,1](x)b
[1,1]
t ×
2∑
u=1
A[u,2](x)
(
a
[u,2]
t +
b
[u,2]
t
3− u4V
[u,2]
t+1 (x)
)}
/d(x),
where d(x) = A[1,2](x)b
[1,2]
t × 2
∑2
i=1A
[i,i](x)b
[i,i]
t + 4
∏2
i=1A
[i,i](x)b
[i,i]
t . The theorem follows.
Lemma 1 below is needed in our proofs of Part 2 of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. Recall
that r(u) := N − u+ 1. Define At(i) =
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i a
[u,v]
t δt, gt(i) :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i b
[u,v]
t δt/(v − u+ 1),
Gt(i,xt) =
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i b
[u,v]
t ∆V
[u,v]
t+1 (xt)δt/(v−u+ 1), and ht(i, j) :=
∑j
u=1
∑N
v=i b
[u,v]
t δt/(v−u+ 1).
Lemma 1. If a
[u,v]
t = a
[r(v),r(u)]
t and b
[u,v]
t = b
[r(v),r(u)]
t for each t = 1, . . . T and (u, v) ∈ UV, then
At(i) = At(r(i)) and gt(i) = gt(r(i)) for i ∈ N ; and ht(i, j) = ht(r(j), r(i)) for each (i, j) ∈ UV.
In addition, at period t, if ∆V
[u,v]
t (xt) = ∆V
[r(v),r(u)]
t (xt) for each (u, v) ∈ UV, then Gt(i,xt) =
Gt(r(i),xt).
Proof. For a given i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the equality At(i) = At(r(i)) follows directly from our assumption
a
[u,v]
t = a
[r(v),r(u)]
t . The equalities gt(i) = gt(r(i)) and ht(i, j) = ht(r(j), r(i)) hold because the
term b
[u,v]
t δt/(v − u + 1) corresponding to class u-v in both gt(i) and ht(i, j) is equal to the term
b
[r(u),r(v)]
t δt/(r(u) − r(v) + 1) corresponding to [r(v), r(u)] in both gt(r(i)) and ht(r(j), r(i)). The
equality Gt(i,xt) = Gt(r(i),xt) is true for analogous reasons after accounting for ∆V
[u,v]
t (xt) =
∆V
[r(v),r(u)]
t (xt).
Proof of Proposition 4.
1. We proceed by backward induction on the number of stages. For t = T , we have that
∆V
[u,v]
T+1 (xT+1) = 0. Therefore,
VT (xT ) = max
pT∈PT (xT )
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pT,i
)(
a
[u,v]
T −
b
[u,v]
T
∑v
i=u pT,i
(v − u+ 1)
)
A[u,v](xT ).
Note that the objective function defining VT (xT ) above has a term for every class u-v. Consider the
terms corresponding to classes u-v and r(v)-r(u) in the objective functions of VT (x
1
T ) and VT (x
2
T ),
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respectively.
(VT (x
1
T ) [u, v] term):
(
v∑
i=u
pT,i
)(
a
[u,v]
T −
b
[u,v]
T
∑v
i=u pT,i
(v − u+ 1)
)
A[u,v](x1T ). (40)
(VT (x
2
T ) [r(v), r(u)] term):
 r(u)∑
i=r(v)
pT,i
(a[r(v),r(u)]T
−
b
[r(v),r(u)]
T
∑r(u)
i=r(v) pT,i
(r(u)− r(v) + 1)
A[r(v),r(u)](x2T ). (41)
Since we assume x1T,i = x
2
T,r(i) for all i = 1, . . . , N , we have that A
[u,v](x1T ) = A
[r(v),r(u)](x2T ).
Moreover, given our assumption that a
[u,v]
T = a
[r(v),r(u)]
T and b
[u,v]
T = b
[r(v),r(u)]
T for each (u, v) ∈ UV,
and (v − u+ 1) = (r(u)− r(v) + 1), (41) is equivalent to r(u)∑
i=r(v)
pT,i
a[u,v]T − b[u,v]T
∑r(u)
i=r(v) pT,i
(v − u+ 1)
A[u,v](x1T ).
Therefore, relabeling the variables pT,i as pT,N−i+1 (i.e. permuting them) makes the above term
equivalent to (40). Since we chose class u-v arbitrarily, it follows that the objective functions of
VT (x
1
T ) and VT (x
2
T ) are equivalent under a relabeling of variables. Moreover, constraints in PT (xT )
remain equivalent under this relabeling. Therefore, the optimization problems determining VT (x
1
T )
and VT (x
2
T ) are equivalent and VT (x
1
T ) = VT (x
2
T ).
Assume that for t = t′ + 1, . . . , T we have Vt(x1t ) = Vt(x2t ) for all pairs (x1t ,x2t ) such that
x1t,i = x
2
t,r(i) for all i = 1, . . . , N . We now show this property to hold for period t
′. Recall that
Vt′(xt′) = max
pt′∈Pt′ (xt′ )
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=u
(
v∑
i=u
pt′,i −∆V [u,v]t′+1 (xt′+1)
)(
a
[u,v]
t′ −
b
[u,v]
t′
∑v
i=u pt′,i
(v − u+ 1)
)
A[u,v](xt′).
(42)
If ∆V
[u,v]
t′+1 (x
1
t′+1) = ∆V
[r(v),r(u)]
t′+1 (x
2
t′+1), we can show that Vt′(x
1
t′) = Vt′(x
2
t′) by mirroring the
arguments used in our proof for stage T , that is, we can establish that the optimization problems
determining Vt′(x
1
t′) and Vt′(x
2
t′) are equivalent. The equality ∆V
[u,v]
t′+1 (x
1
t′+1) = ∆V
[r(v),r(u)]
t′+1 (x
2
t′+1)
follows because (i) Vt′+1(x
1
t′) is equal to Vt′+1(x
2
t′) and (ii) Vt′+1(x
1
t′ − eu,v) is equal to Vt′+1(x2t′ −
er(v),r(u)). Condition (i) is a direct consequence of our induction hypothesis. Condition (ii) also
follows from the induction hypothesis because the i-th components of x1t′ and eu,v coincide with
the r(t)-th components of x2t′ and er(v),r(u), respectively, which implies that the vectors x
[1,u,v]
t′ :=
x1t′ − eu,v and x[2,r(v),r(u)]t′ := x2t′ − er(v),r(u) satisfy x[1,u,v]t′,i = x[2,r(v),r(u)]t′,r(i) . Thus, Vt′(x1t′) = Vt′(x2t′)
and the proof is complete based on the principle of mathematical induction.
2. We provide an overview of our proof strategy before discussing the details. Consider the optimiza-
tion problem (3), which we label P , determining p∗t in period t and state xt, where xt,i = xt,N−i+1
for all i = 1, . . . , bN/2c by assumption. We also construct a problem P ′ starting from P by rela-
beling its variable pt,i as p
′
t,r(i) for each i = 1, . . . , N . Our focus will be to show that the vector
p′∗t defined as p′
,∗
t,i := p
∗
t,i for all i = 1, . . . , N is an optimal solution to P
′. This relationship plus
the transformation we applied (pt,i = p
′
t,r(i) for each i = 1, . . . , N) implies that p
∗
t,i = p
∗
t,r(i) for all
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i = 1, . . . , bN/2c.
Since the room capacity vector xt is reflective, we have that A
[u,v](xt) = A
[r(v),r(u)](xt). We
therefore suppress the indicator function A[u,v](xt) in the discussion below to ease exposition. Con-
sider the original and transformed problems:
p∗t := argmax
pt∈Pt(xt)
N∑
i=1
pt,i
[
(At(i) +Gt(i,xt))−
N∑
i=1
pt,igt(i)
−
 i−1∑
j=1
pt,jht(i, j) +
N∑
j=i+1
pt,jht(j, i)
 ; (43)
p′∗t := argmax
p′t∈Pt(xt)
N∑
i=1
p′t,i
[
(At(r(i)) +Gt(r(i),xt))−
N∑
i=1
p′t,igt(r(i))
−
r(i)−1∑
j=1
p′t,r(j)ht(i, j) +
N∑
j=r(i)+1
p′t,r(j)ht(j, i)
 . (44)
From Lemma 1 it immediately follows that the objective function coefficients of the linear and
quadratic terms of pt,i and p
′
t,i are the same. Since ht(i, j) = ht(r(i), r(j)), also by Lemma 1, the
sums
∑i−1
j=1 pt,jht(i, j) and
∑N
j=i+1 pt,jht(j, i) are identical to the sums
∑N
j=r(i)+1 p
′
t,r(j)ht(j, i) and∑r(i)−1
j=1 p
′
t,r(j)ht(i, j), respectively. Thus, the objective function terms corresponding to pt,i and p
′
t,i
in (43) and (44), respectively, are the same (except for the cosmetic label p and p′). It is also easy
to verify that the constraints involving pt,i and p
′
t,i are the same. Thus, it follows that p
′∗
t is an
optimal solution to (44).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Since xt > 1, we haveA
[u,v](xt) = 1, for all (u, v) ∈ UV. Define G¯t(i,xt) =
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i ∆V
[u,v]
t+1 (xt)/(v−
u+ 1), g¯t(i) :=
∑i
u=1
∑N
v=i 1/(v − u+ 1) and h¯t(i, j) :=
∑j
u=1
∑N
v=i 1/(v − u+ 1). By assumption
the optimal room rate vector is in the interior of Pt(xt). Therefore, these optimal room rates solve
p∗t := argmax
pt
N∑
i=1
pt,i
i× aδt × r(i) + bδtG¯t(i,xt) i−1∑
j=1
−
N∑
i=1
bδtpt,ig¯t(i)− bδt
 i−1∑
j=1
pt,j h¯t(i, j) +
N∑
j=i+1
pt,j h¯t(j, i)
 .
The objective function is concave (by virtue of Theorem 1), p∗t is determined by the following first
order conditions of this function with respect to the room prices:
2pig¯t(i) +
i−1∑
j=1
pj h¯t(i, j) +
N∑
j=i+1
pjht(j, i) = i× a
b
× r(i) + G¯t(i,xt),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (45)
We now focus on the case of N = 8. To ease notation we suppress dependence on t, and define
I1,1 = 2g¯(1) + h¯(8, 1), I1,2 = h¯(2, 1) + h¯(7, 1), I1,3 = h¯(3, 1) + h¯(6, 1), I1,4 = h¯(4, 1) + h¯(5, 1),
I2,2 = 2g¯(2) + h¯(7, 2), I2,3 = h¯(3, 2) + h¯(6, 2), I2,4 = h¯(4, 2) + h¯(5, 2), I3,3 = 2g¯(3) + h¯(6, 3),
I3,4 = h¯(4, 3) + h¯(5, 3), and I1,1 = 2g¯(4) + h¯(5, 4). Since we assume a reflective capacity vector, by
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Proposition 4, pi = pr(i) for i = 1, . . . , bN/2c in the solution of the first order equations. Further,
by applying this condition and Lemma 1 (with aδt and bδt equal to 1) we obtain the following set
of four equations that determine p1, p2, p3, and p4:
I1,1p1 + I1,2p2 + I1,3p3 + I1,4p4 =
a
b
N + G¯t(1,xt);
I1,2p1 + I2,2p2 + I2,3p3 + I2,4p4 = 2
a
b
(N − 1) + G¯t(2,xt);
I1,3p1 + I2,3p2 + I3,3p3 + I3,4p4 = 3
a
b
(N − 2) + G¯t(3,xt);
I1,4p1 + I2,4p2 + I3,4p3 + I4,4p4 = 4
a
b
(N − 3) + G¯t(4,xt).
Applying Gaussian elimination, the expression for p1, . . . , p4 can be obtained in closed form (and
thus by Proposition 4 the remaining prices as well). Define
D := I21,4I
2
2,3 − 2I1,3I1,4I2,3I2,4 + I21,3I22,4 − I21,4I2,2I3,3 + 2I1,2I1,4I2,4I3,3 − I1,1I22,4I3,3
+ 2I1,3I1,4I2,2I3,4 − 2I1,2I1,4I2,3I3,4 − 2I1,2I1,3I2,4I3,4 + 2I1,1I2,3I2,4I3,4 + I21,2I23,4
− I1,1I2,2I23,4 − I21,3I2,2I(4, 4) + 2I1,2I1,3I2,3I(4, 4)− I1,1I22,3I(4, 4)− I21,2I3,3I(4, 4)
+ I1,1I2,2I3,3I(4, 4);
C1,1 := − (I22,4I3,3 − 2I2,3I2,4I3,4 + I2,2I23,4 + I22,3I4,4 − I2,2I3,3I4,4);
C1,2 := − (−I1,4I2,4I3,3 + I1,4I2,3I3,4 + I1,3I2,4I3,4 − I1,2I23,4 − I1,3I2,3I4,4 + I1,2I3,3I4,4);
C1,3 := − (I1,4I2,3I2,4 − I1,3I22,4 − I1,4I2,2I3,4 + I1,2I2,4I3,4 + I1,3I2,2I4,4 − I1,2I2,3I4,4);
C1,4 := − (−I1,4I22,3 + I1,3I2,3I2,4 + I1,4I2,2I3,3 − I1,2I2,4I3,3 − I1,3I2,2I3,4 + I1,2I2,3I3,4);
C2,1 := − (−I1,4I2,4I3,3 + I1,4I2,3I3,4 + I1,3I2,4I3,4 − I1,2I23,4 − I1,3I2,3I4,4 + I1,2I3,3I4,4);
C2,2 := − (I21,4I3,3 − 2I1,3I1,4I3,4 + I1,1I23,4 + I21,3I4,4 − I1,1I3,3I4,4);
C2,3 := − (−I21,4I2,3 + I1,3I1,4I2,4 + I1,2I1,4I3,4 − I1,1I2,4I3,4 − I1,2I1,3I4,4 + I1,1I2,3I4,4);
C2,4 := − (I1,3I1,4I2,3 − I21,3I2,4 − I1,2I1,4I3,3 + I1,1I2,4I3,3 + I1,2I1,3I3,4 − I1,1I2,3I3,4);
C3,1 := (−I1,4I2,3I2,4 + I1,3I22,4 + I1,4I2,2I3,4 − I1,2I2,4I3,4 − I1,3I2,2I4,4 + I1,2I2,3I4,4);
C3,2 := (I
2
1,4I2,3 − I1,3I1,4I2,4 − I1,2I1,4I3,4 + I1,1I2,4I3,4 + I1,2I1,3I4,4 − I1,1I2,3I4,4);
C3,3 := (−I21,4I2,2 + 2I1,2I1,4I2,4 − I1,1I22,4 − I21,2I4,4 + I1,1I2,2I4,4);
C3,4 := (I1,3I1,4I2,2 − I1,2I1,4I2,3 − I1,2I1,3I2,4 + I1,1I2,3I2,4 + I21,2I3,4 − I1,1I2,2I3,4);
C4,1 := (I1,4I
2
2,3 − I1,3I2,3I2,4 − I1,4I2,2I3,3 + I1,2I2,4I3,3 + I1,3I2,2I3,4 − I1,2I2,3I3,4);
C4,2 := (−I1,3I1,4I2,3 + I21,3I2,4 + I1,2I1,4I3,3 − I1,1I2,4I3,3 − I1,2I1,3I3,4 + I1,1I2,3I3,4);
C4,3 := (I1,3I1,4I2,2 − I1,2I1,4I2,3 − I1,2I1,3I2,4 + I1,1I2,3I2,4 + I21,2I3,4 − I1,1I2,2I3,4);
C4,4 := (−I21,3I2,2 + 2I1,2I1,3I2,3 − I1,1I22,3 − I21,2I3,3 + I1,1I2,2I3,3).
The closed form expression for the room price on day i ∈ N is
pi ≡ pr(i) =
Ci,1
D
(a
b
N + G¯t(1,xt)
)
+
Ci,2
D
(
2
a
b
(N − 1) + G¯t(2,xt)
)
+
Ci,3
D
(
3
a
b
(N − 2) + G¯t(3,xt)
)
+
Ci,4
D
(
4
a
b
(N − 3) + G¯t(4,xt)
)
. (46)
In the public holiday case, the class (4, 5) demand is αa, while the demand of the remaining
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classes remains at a. Accordingly inflating the base demand in the term corresponding to day four
in equation (46) gives
pi ≡ pr(i) =
Ci,1
D
(a
b
N + G¯t(1,xt)
)
+
Ci,2
D
(
2
a
b
(N − 1) + G¯t(2,xt)
)
+
Ci,3
D
(
3
a
b
(N − 2) + G¯t(3,xt)
)
+
Ci,4
D
(
4
a
b
(N − 3 + (α− 1)) + G¯t(4,xt)
)
.
The derivative of price with respect to α is
∂pi/∂α ≡ ∂pr(i)/∂α =
a
b
× Ci,4
D
for each i = 1, . . . , bN/2c.
The ratio a/b does not affect either the sign or the ordering of derivatives ∂pi/∂α, i = 1, . . . , bN/2c
because it is strictly positive and appears in each derivate. Therefore, it suffices to check C1,4/D,
C2,4/D, C3,4/D, and C4,4/D, which evaluate to−0.0073, −0.0151, −0.0343, and 0.0837, respectively,
for N equals to eight. The sign and ordering of these numbers confirms our claimed results for the
public holiday setting.
For the conference setting, the high-demand class is (3, 6) and equation (46) transforms to
pi ≡ pr(i) =
Ci,1
D
(a
b
N + G¯t(1,xt)
)
+
Ci,2
D
(
2
a
b
(N − 1) + G¯t(2,xt)
)
+
Ci,3
D
(
3
a
b
(N − 2 + (α− 1)) + G¯t(3,xt)
)
+
Ci,4
D
(
4
a
b
(N − 3 + (α− 1)) + G¯t(4,xt)
)
.
The derivative of price with respect to α is
∂pi/∂α ≡ ∂pr(i)/∂α =
a
b
× Ci,3 + Ci,4
D
for each i = 1, . . . , bN/2c.
Using the same arguments as in the public holiday case, we can verify the order/sign of the deriva-
tives for the conference case by computing the ratios
C1,3 + C1,4
D
,
C2,3 + C2,4
D
,
C3,3 + C3,4
D
, and
C4,3 + C4,4
D
, which evaluate to −0.0201, −0.0447, 0.0758, and 0.0494, respectively. Hence, our
claimed results hold.
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